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ABSTRACT 
Public pension system costs constitute a significant part of government expenses. 
Private pension systems have been developed as an alternative and/or as a complement 
to the public systems. In Turkey, the Private Pension System was given a head start in 
2003. Although the system aims to provide supplementary income to the public 
pensions at retirement, observations reveal that many participants prefer to exit the 
system before retirement. The purpose of this study is to identify the characteristics of 
participants, who are more likely to exit earlier than retirement using the total 
population of contract buyers since the start of the system until 2011. The data is 
obtained from the Pension Monitor Center, and covers the customer and contract 
characteristics of more than 75% of all lapse types in the period. Impact of 
demographic factors and contract features are examined using the logit model. We 
divide the sample into different groups of customers according to their monthly 
contributions to the system. The results of econometric analysis reveal evidence of a 
significant relationship between exit decision and features such as education level, 
occupation, total accumulated savings, geographical regions, pension sales channel 
and payment instruments. Staying long enough in the system increases participants’ 
continuity. Our elaborations also provide some tips for pension companies to ensure 
longevity and retirement of customers. 
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1. Introduction 
Public pension system costs constitute a significant part of government 
expenses. Although the public pension systems provide some coverage for retirement 
incomes, mostly these are not sufficient to maintain the standard of living attained in 
working life in retirement (Harrison, et al., 2006). The “Pay-As-You-Go” model 
adopted by many countries mean that every generation pays for previous generations’ 
benefits. However, the increase in life expectancy and ageing populations of 
particularly developed countries put this system in danger. The number of pensioners 
increases more rapidly than labor force participation rate. Therefore, countries prefer 
to promote private pension schemes to ease the difficulties in paying the pensions of 
ageing populations and thus decrease the burden on their budgets (Blake, 2000). In 
many countries public and private pensions systems go side-by side as complementary 
mechanisms. 
Buying a private pension plan is similar to saving for the future that allows 
participants to maintain their standard of living even after retirement. The individuals, 
who buy a pension plan today, postpone their consumption to the future i.e., make an 
intertemporal choice and decide on the optimum behavior by discounting their future 
utility (Berns et al., 2007). Purchase decision of pension schemes as for most financial 
assets is critical and most individuals find the alternatives complex and difficult to 
understand. This complexity and the size of the choice set actually affect the 
involvement of the customers in terms of participation and persistence (Harrison et al., 
2006).  
Turkey is a late adapter of the private pension system mainly because of the 
well developed public pension system. The public pension system in Turkey was and 
 
 
still is mandatory and based on defined-benefit plans, in which the retirement incomes 
depend on earnings, employment period and on accrual rate
1
 varying with years of 
service -and in favour of early years. Whitehouse (2006) finds that in comparison to 
30 OECD countries, the public pension system of Turkey fairs quite well among these 
countries with respect to different measures such as replacement rate, relative average 
pension level and average pension wealth
2
. The extent of informality in Turkey pushes 
individuals to retire early (mostly as soon as they are able) and work in the informal 
sector (Brook and Whitehouse, 2006). This opportunity causes a lower participation in 
the private pension system compared to other similar countries. 
The private pension system introduced in 2003-called the Individual Pension 
System (IPS), is a voluntary defined-contribution (DC) pension system
3
 and was 
developed as complementary to the public pension system. Whitehouse (2006) 
calculates that the  Turkish public pensions paid at least 75% of pre-retirement level 
on average earnings, a relatively high replacement rate compared to some OECD 
countries such as France, Iceland, Japan, Norway, and the Slovak Republic before the 
introduction of the voluntary private pension system. As of 2002, Turkey and 
Luxembourg stand out as countries not only with high replacement rates but also with 
“relatively high pension promises to ... low-income workers” among OECD countries 
(Whitehouse, 2006). The relative average pension level paid in Turkey is the third 
                                                          
1
 Accrual rate is the pension entitlement as a percentage of individual earnings for each year of 
contributions. In Turkey, there are three accrual rates, the typical rate being 2%. The highest accrual rate 
is for the first few years of coverage and the lowest for later years in longer contribution histories 
(Whitehouse, 2006). 
2
 Whitehouse (2006) defines “weighted average relative pension level” as the share of average 
economywide earnings promised to future pensioners. A measure of 100 indicates that the pension 
system pays a weighted average pension equal to average earnings. A relatively comprehensive measure 
of the aggregate pension promise is the “average pension wealth”, calculated on the basis of average 
OECD income distribution and the life expectancy in the respective countries.  
3
 DC pension system is quite similar to saving accounts that the participants pay a specific amount into 
an account and get the accumulated sum upon retirement (Haverstick et al., 2010). 
 
 
highest in the same group of countries and above 75%. The average pension wealth of 
men is 10 times and women is 12 times of the average earnings
4
 (Whitehouse, 2006). 
The IPS allows individuals to take up more than one pension contract and 
anyone who is over 18, living in Turkey or Turkish citizens living abroad can 
participate (PMC, 2012). According to the official documentation on IPS (PMC, 2012) 
retirement earnings are determined by accumulated contributions and by profits from 
the funds in which the contributions were invested at. The individuals can specify the 
mutual funds or prefer the default plans. Participants may transfer his/her 
accumulations to another pension company. However contributions should be paid to 
system for at least 1 year. The possibility of changing the pension plan or distribution 
to fund types is limited to at most four times a year. Those, who complete the vesting 
period, may claim his/her accumulations completely or partially as lump sum beside 
the monthly benefits. 
Participation in voluntary pension schemes especially in developing countries 
like Turkey remains quite low at the initial periods of introduction. Nonetheless, it is 
possible to increase purchase of pension contracts through government incentives such 
as tax exemption, government contribution etc. A relatively more important problem 
in the Turkish IPS is the pre-mature lapse from the private pension system, where 
participants leave the system before retirement for various reasons.  
This paper examines factors that influence the exit decision of individuals from 
the pension system prematurely before retirement in Turkey.  Although there are some 
studies that consider the financial side of the Turkish public and private pension 
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 The calculation of average pension wealth depends on pension eligibility age, mortality rate and 
indexation procedures. Therefore, as a country with relatively short life expectancy, the pension wealth 
in Turkey is more modest compared to countries such as Luxembourg, Austria, Finland (Whitehouse, 
2006). 
 
 
systems, the literature does not provide any analysis of the exit decision of consumers 
in Turkey (such as Teksoz et al., 1998; Sayan and Kiraci, 2001a, 2001b). We consider 
the effects of individual specific characteristics and some contract features to 
determine how impactful these are. In analyzing the exit behavior we make some 
conjectures prior to the analysis and test the validity of these hypotheses using the 
logit model.  The main findings reveal a significant relationship between exit and the 
usual suspects such as age, gender, marital status, education level. Additionally, we 
find that size of monthly contributions, payment channel, and contract life also 
influences the exit decision from the system.  
The paper is structured along the hypotheses which are developed in section 2. 
We use some of the original data as they are and generate other variables in the 
analysis, and these are explained in section 3. The following section provides the 
findings and elaborates them with respect to the hypotheses. The paper concludes with 
an overview and some suggestions.  
 
2. Hypothesis 
 Variability in consumer behaviour can be assessed  
 and explained by taking account of segmentation 
 within populations. (Harrison et al., 2006) 
Previous research has conclusive findings about the impact of demographics on 
consumer behavior including the decision to enter or exit pension schemes, choosing 
pension plans, etc. (such as Harrison et al., 2006; Stanley et al., 1985). Ginn (2003) 
and DWP (2002)  gives evidence of gender differences in terms of individuals’ 
pension behaviour and the Pensions Provision Group (2001) suggests age as another 
 
 
divergent factor on pension behaviour of individuals. Between women and men, even 
in developed economies, there are equality issues with respect to labour force 
participation, social responsibilities and roles, wage payments, opportunity of 
education, etc. These matters influence women’s pension behaviour for choice of 
plans, risk aversion, exit decisions. The literature provides detailed analysis of these 
equality issues and their relationship to pensions. Unlike most relatively developed 
countries, following the pension reform in 1990s, women’s participation in the 
personal pension scheme in Chile was higher than men’s (Barrientos, 1998). The main 
factor in this high participation rate is the compulsoriness of the private pensions. 
Barrientos (1998) finds that household responsibilities, work patterns and pension 
design are the main factors that determine the pension coverage of women. Defined 
benefit plans penalize short-tenured, short-hours workers and reward long-tenured 
stayers (Ippolito, 1994). Similarly, findings by Even and Macpherson (1994) indicate 
that women-men pension coverage differences arise mainly from labour market factors 
including earnings and type of employer. Whereas the number of children and marital 
status elevate the gender pension gap, a substantial portion of the gender gap is 
explained by job characteristics (Even and Macpherson, 1990).  Women, especially in 
countries like Turkey that experience high volatility of growth, have low labour force 
participation rates and are usually considered as the income-earner in desperate times 
i.e., if men loose their jobs. Therefore, in most cases women have short-spells of 
working life and are mainly part-time workers.  
H1: Women have a higher likelihood to exit the pension system before retirement.  
As mentioned by Smith (2006) in her evaluation of UK pension system, 
securing a sufficient retirement income depends highly on the “individuals’ 
willingness and ability to save” in their working lives under DC pension plans. 
 
 
Willingness and ability to save is determined by many factors such as the 
foresightedness of the individuals and their risk behavior, their age, their income levels 
and occupation/employment status.  Some of these factors influence the decision to 
take up an IPS plan or not, but others dominate the amount of contributions, the 
length/age of contracts, the choice of specific schemes/mutual funds. Decision to enter 
the IPS depends on the forward-looking behavior, which is attributed to features such 
as age, marital status, parenthood in the literature (Engström and Westerberg, 2003; 
Smith, 2006).  
Age may influence the entry decision in twofold: for younger individuals, old 
age is a far away situation so they might be less inclined to take up a pension plan, 
whereas for old individuals, who have already planned for their retirement and old age, 
taking up a new pension plan would be an unnecessary spending therefore they may be 
less likely to do so as well. A change in living standards as a result of retirement from 
work may also lead to termination of the pension contract depending on the 
replacement rate of the actual pension. If the individual suffers a loss in her/his 
standard of living after retirement, (s)he may need the accumulated savings in the 
private pension plan to sustain the previous wealth level. Supportive evidence comes 
from Smith (2006), who cites figures for levels of lapsing 1 in 8 after a year, 1 in 3 
after four years for the UK and attributes these persistency rates to low levels of funds 
accumulated for retirement. Hence, we expect the lapsing from the IPS to first 
decrease then increase with age.  
H2: Older individuals are more likely to exit IPS. 
Marriage, on the other hand, requires  planning the future for more than oneself 
and therefore, a more forward looking behaviour. Engström and Westerberg (2003) 
 
 
provide evidence for the positive affect of marital status on active decision taking of 
individuals on investment plans for the Swedish labour force. Hence, we use marital 
status as a proxy for forward looking behaviour and claim that married individuals are 
likely to have a higher tendency to persist with IPS plans than single individuals
5
.  
 H3: Married individuals are more likely to persist in IPS. 
Income and contribution levels of individuals and their employment status 
determine their “ability to save”. High income levels and thus ability to contribute at 
large amounts to the pension schemes are usually associated with each other and 
occupation/employment status. Individuals who can make large pension payments are 
those at the upper end of the income distribution and are most likely to have other 
saving opportunities and diverse portfolios in terms of assets. These individuals will 
not be in destitute for the accumulated savings in the pension account. However, the 
less wealthy individuals may see these savings as a relief fund in times of need. 
Therefore, we expect to see that at low contribution levels individuals would be more 
inclined to terminate the pension contract than at higher levels.   
H4: High level contributers (high income individuals) are less likely to lapse IPS. 
It is not only the amount of contributions that influence the total size of funds 
accumulated but also the contract life/length or age of the contract. In the Turkish IPS, 
the individuals become eligible for retirement after 10 years. As individuals get closer 
to the ten year mark they are expected to have a higher tendency to persist in 
contributing to the scheme.  
H5: As contract life increases individuals persist in IPS. 
                                                          
5
 Parenthood can be thought of as another condition that leads individuals to have a forward looking 
behaviour. However, the dataset for the IPS contributers in Turkey lack information on this issue 
therefore we use only marital status. 
 
 
As mentioned above employment status and occupation affect individuals’ 
ability to save
6
. The impact of occupation on exit decision from IPS depends highly on 
the sector the individual works. People working in the financial sector are quite 
familiar with alternative saving opportunities and assets. This financial 
literacy/familiarity may cause individuals to exit the system at higher income levels. 
Engström and Westerberg (2003) emphasize the evidence from the literature on the 
relationship between familiarity and investment (e.g. Huberman, 2001).  Those that 
are at the disadvantaged end of the income scale may continue saving through the IPS 
but those with upper-middle and high incomes may prefer alternative assets since they 
have both the funds and the knowledge to invest. So, we expect the high income 
professionals of the financial sector to exit IPS whereas low income employees to stay.  
H6: Lapse from IPS increases with income level in the financial sector.  
Another feature that is considered as a proxy for financial market familiarity by 
Engström and Westerberg (2003) is individual’s education level. They argue, with 
support from the literature (Bayer et al., 1996), that individuals with higher level of 
education will participate more in the pension investment plans. We agree with this 
assertion not in terms of participation –something we are not concerned with in this 
paper- but in terms of persistence. Individuals with higher education levels are more 
open to learning new things and have the ability to examine and understand workings 
of complex systems such as the IPS. So they will not be driven to exit due to 
uncertainty in the short-term.  
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 People who are not working (retired, student, unemployed) for whatever reason are dependent upon 
others to pay their expenses and sustain their living. This may lead them to stop contributing to a 
pension plan in order to end the dependency or they may prefer to remain in the system and accumulate 
some wealth. Regrettably, the dataset contains only occupation data making it impossible to assess 
which facet dominates. 
 
 
H7: The higher the education level of the individual the more likely (s)he is to persist 
in the IPS.  
It is not only the familiarity with financial assets and investment opportunities 
that determine access to information on these issues but also the general characteristics 
and social norms associated with the community individuals are a part of. Therefore, 
we use the level of development in the region the individual lives as a proxy for social 
norms. Turkey is divided into seven geographical regions as the Marmara (incl. 
Istanbul, the most populated and the most developed city in the country), Aegean, 
Mediterranean, Central Anatolia, Black Sea, Eastern Anatolia and Southeastern 
Anatolia. These regions are quite different from each other not only geographically but 
also economically. This divergence can easily be seen from statistical data on the 
annual average household disposable incomes (Table 1, below). 
    Table 1. Annual Household Disposable Income in Regions of Turkey 
 
Multiple of Turkish Average 
Marmara 1.163 
Aegean 1.090 
Central Anatolia 0.944 
Mediterranean 0.902 
Black Sea 0.829 
Eastern Anatolia 0.786 
Southeastern Anatolia 0.648 
TURKEY (AVERAGE) $13528.89
7
   
     Source: Own calculations using TurkStat data. 
Considering that aspect, we hypothesize that in the relatively developed regions 
individuals can and do plan for their future lives more than less developed regions.  
H8: Individuals living in the relatively developed regions of the country have a lower 
tendency to lapse.  
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 $1=1.80 Turkish Lira 
 
 
Many other variables are used in the analysis for which we have no prior 
opinion on the relationship to lapsing or exit decision of individuals. Hence, the 
evidence is gathered from the analysis and these are reported in the findings section. 
But before examining the results, data and the variables used in the investigation need 
some elaboration. 
3. Data and Variables 
This paper analyses the impact of various features of contracts and participants on the 
most significant lapse behavior (75% of all lapse types) i.e., exit from the system, since 
the start of the IPS until 2011. The data is obtained from the Pension Monitor Center 
(PMC) and constitutes of the total population of (5,057,298) contracts covering 
information on demographics, usage or temporal features/behaviors of the related 
contracts for current participants and ex-members. Some of the variables are used 
directly from the PMC data and some others are generated from the information from 
the data set. The first group consists of gender, age, marital status, education levels, 
occupation status, lapse types, geographical region, payment frequency, payment 
instrument, contract type, sales channel, and entrance type. Table 1 reports the 
frequency of participants with relevant features, as grouped in categories such as 
gender, education, occupation etc., and shows the contract specifications again in 
categories. The age distribution of the participants is depicted in Figure 1.  
 [INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE] 
 
 
 
As mentioned earlier, not all variables used in estimations are acquired directly from 
the data set but some are generated to fit our purposes. These are contract life, total 
savings, and monthly contributions. 
Contract life is calculated as “days” from the difference between entrance date 
and termination date for lapsed participants or the date of preparation of data set for 
active participants. Then those “days” are converted into months assuming a month to 
be 30 days. Figure 2 shows the distribution of contract life in months. 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 HERE] 
There is no information in the data set on the total funds accumulated (savings) 
over the contract life period but the data gives only the payment in the last month. In 
order to calculate total savings we assume that the real value of the monthly 
contributions have remained constant over the years. In other words, a participant that 
pays 500 TL ($278) in 2011 is assumed to have paid 372 TL ($182) in 2007, which is 
calculated by deflating using the GDP deflator. The total savings accumulated is 
evaluated at the average rates of return to the funds to produce real contributions
8
. 
In IPS there are 4 different types of payment periods i.e., monthly, quarterly, 
semi-annually and annually. Distribution of data shows that most participants prefer 
monthly payments/contributions. In order to ensure comparability, all contributions 
have been converted to average monthly payments and the contracts were classified 
into groups according to payment levels and form market segments (see Table 3).  
                                                          
8 Annual Average Returns 
Years 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Return (%) 6 24 20 11 18 10 22 9 -1 8 
   Source: various progress reports on IPS, PMC. 
 
 
        
[INSERT TABLE 3 HERE] 
  
 
 
4. Findings 
The findings of logit estimations (see Table 4) are overviewed in this section. Logit 
estimation methodology is used to model discrete outcomes, where there is a single 
decision among two or more alternatives. The results are evaluated with respect to a 
reference category or alternative
9
. The respective reference categories are indicated 
next to the major variables in the Tables 4 and 5.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 HERE] 
Most of the factors examined to explain the lapse behaviour are found to be highly 
significant in the estimations. However, the estimation results in logit models, like those 
of any nonlinear regression model, do not show the marginal effects. Therefore, 
marginal effects need to be estimated separately.  A marginal effect measures the effect of 
a regressor on the mean of the dependent variable and is equal to the relevant slope 
coefficient in linear regression models. Hence, it is more relevant to elaborate the impact 
of various characteristics on exit behavior using the marginal effects estimations, given in 
Table 5.  Consequently, the results of empirical estimations can be used to evaluate 
whether the hypotheses are validated or falsified by the data. 
[INSERT TABLE 5 HERE] 
 Analysis of individual’s behavior in four segments reveals that “Older 
individuals are more likely to exit IPS” if they belong to the lower contribution 
segments. Individuals, who pay more than 1500 TL ($833.33) as monthly 
contribution, become less prone to exit as they get older. As evidenced in previous 
                                                          
9
 The estimated parameters (β) can be interpreted as a one-unit increase in the variable xi is associated 
with a βi unit increase in the relative log odds of being in that specific category j versus the reference 
category.   
 
 
literature (such as Even and Macpherson, 1994; Barrientos, 1998; Ginn, 2003) gender 
makes a difference in terms of pension behavior. Contrary to our expectations, 
findings reveal that Turkish women once they enter the IPS -the ratio of women to men 
in the system is 1:2- are less likely to exit IPS.   
Married individuals, who constitute 2/3 of the total number of participants, are 
more likely to persist in IPS if they make monthly contributions greater than 500 TL. 
In the lowest contributions group, the single individuals have a lower probability of 
lapse compared to the married ones. But the results show that once the individual gets 
a divorce or widowed regardless of their level of contribution then perhaps the 
decrease in their family income forces these individuals to exit the IPS and use the 
money for other expenses. 
The higher the education level of the individual the more likely (s)he is to 
persist in the IPS.  The probability of lapse compared to uneducated participants 
decreases with education for all segments. This shows that educated individuals are 
both more concerned with the future and old age, and have the means to save for the 
future. Probably, the highest educated people are relatively more familiar with 
financial services or they have better access to information on these services and thus 
are more inclined to take up a pension scheme. 
We see a similar effect of work on exit behavior. The lapse risk of individuals 
changes with the sector they work in and their occupation. For example, labourers and 
technicians have a lower likelihood of exit compared to those that are self-employed. 
Interestingly, the lapse behavior of housewives, people not working and engineers and 
architects do not change with income but the exits of those individuals whose 
occupation is in the finance sector changes. Exit from IPS increases with income level 
 
 
in the financial sector. The individuals who are working in the financial sector have a 
lower lapse risk at low income levels but the likelihood of exit from IPS for finance 
sector professionals increases as their incomes increase. For those that have a monthly 
contribution of more than 1500 TL the odds of exit is higher than those at low 
contribution levels. 
The development level of the region an individual lives in shapes her (his) 
attitude to life in general and to unfamiliar ways in particular. Introduction of an 
unfamiliar savings method may not be welcomed in relatively conservative 
communities. It may not be too erroneous to suppose that underdeveloped regions and 
communities are more conservative and thus members would probably not prefer to 
take up private pension plans. However, individuals living in these regions have little 
opportunity to retire with satisfactory benefits. As hypothesized, participants living in 
the relatively developed regions of Turkey seem to have a lower tendency to lapse. 
Mediterranean, Aegean and the reference category Marmara region are relatively 
developed regions of Turkey. Individuals, who are living in those regions, are less 
prone to lapse compared to those living in others if their monthly contributions are less 
than 3000 TL. Otherwise, the only region that has a lower exit probability is Marmara, 
which is the most developed region in Turkey.  The hypothesis is validated for the 
three lower segments but in the highest segment, development level of the region does 
not make any difference in terms of lapse behavior. 
It is clear from the marginal effects of monthly contributions that as the amount 
of contribution increases the exit probability decreases. So individuals with high level 
of contributions (high income individuals) are less likely to lapse IPS. It is not only the 
amount of contribution that influences the lapse behaviour but also the contract life 
 
 
and total savings. The results reveal that the longer the individuals stay in the IPS the 
longer they tend to stay. In other words, if the pension companies can manage to hold 
the customers in the system long enough then it is more likely that they reach 
retirement from the IPS. As contract life increases individuals persist in IPS. 
Unexpectedly, the findings imply that as individuals accumulate more funds in their 
pensions their probability to exit the system before retirement decreases. Hence, Total 
Savings have a negative influence on the decision to exit. Lapse probability increases 
with the amount of accumulated savings at all segments. 
The impacts of payment channel, contract type and sales channel are also 
found to be highly significant. Although we have not foreseen a systematic behavior, 
paying the contribution through automatic payment order decreases the probability of 
exit in all segments but for the individuals with lower-middle incomes (contributions). 
Individuals making cash payments are more likely to exit. For contract type, in all 
segments but for the individuals with highest contributions, group contract increases 
the exit probability compared to individual contracts, on the other hand, for 
noncontributory contracts lapse probability decreases. Lapse probability increases if 
the sales channel is anything other than Bank assurance for individuals paying more 
than 500 TL as monthly contribution. 
5. CONCLUSION 
Common characteristics of the participants, who exit from private pension system in 
Turkey and of those, who stay in the system, are examined using data on the total 
population of IPS participants with the help of logit model. The analysis shows that 
some factors have a large impact on lapse behaviour. Primarily, staying long enough 
 
 
in the system increases participants’ continuity. So when the system manages to hedge 
early exits, lapse desire will decrease over time. We find that at low contribution levels 
individuals are more inclined to terminate the pension contract than at higher levels.  
So participants need to be encouraged to increase their monthly contributions to ensure 
sustainability in the pension system. The recently introduced government subsidies on 
participants’ contributions may help to keep the individuals in the system and also 
may deter them from exit prematurely. 
Education level has, as predicted, a positive effect in favor of persistence. As 
mentioned earlier, individuals with low levels of education earn less and cannot risk 
their earning on savings instruments that cannot guarantee a pre-specified income. 
Perhaps explaining the benefits of the pension system and the necessity of retired pay 
better could decrease the exit rates of the less educated participants. A similar 
information sharing is needed to ensure the stay of individuals living in the relatively 
underdeveloped regions. Eastern Anatolia seems to be the most adversely affected 
region in that sense.  
There is also a critical point in payment channel choices. Participants, who pay 
their contributions manually (in cash or by bank transfer), are more likely to exit IPS 
before retirement. Therefore, they need to be convinced to switch from manual 
payments to automatic ones like by credit cards or automatic payments. This could be 
promoted with certain discriminating advantages, incentives. Noncontributory 
contracts encourage participants to stay longer because supporter institutions share the 
contributions load with participants. Hence, institutions could be encouraged to draw 
such pension plans for their employees. Another critical point is in the sales channels, 
participants, who enter the system via Agents, have significant lapse rates. Agents may 
 
 
raise expectations during sales because of commissions’ expectations from pension 
companies. So this situation might cause this result. Pension companies may empower 
their audit mechanism over agents.   
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Appendix 
Institutional Framework of the IPS in Turkey 
Individual Pension Advisory Committee (IPAC): The committee decides on the 
individual pension policies and collaborates on IPS issues with the Undersecretariat of 
Treasury, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Labor and Social Security and Capital 
Markets Board of Turkey. (Undersecretariat of Treasury, 2012a). 
 
Undersecretariat of Treasury: Legislative arrangements concerning IPS and 
development studies are executed by the Undersecretariat of Treasury, General 
Directorate of Insurance (GDI). GDI is the chief advisor institution for IPS 
(Undersecretariat of Treasury, 2012b). 
 
Capital Markets Board of Turkey (CMBT): CMBT makes arrangements about pension 
mutual funds, portfolio management companies and contracts and gives approval for 
the information used in pension companies’ advertisements and announcements about 
IPS together with the Undersecretariat of Treasury. It also contributes to legislative 
arrangements about the system (Dalgar, 2006). 
 
Pension Monitoring Center (PMC): PMC is established in accordance with the 
relevant legislation in 2003. It is in charge of ensuring the operation of IPS in a safe, 
transparent and efficient manner; protecting the rights and benefits of participants, and 
collecting and sharing sector data for supervisory public authorities. 
 
Takasbank (ISE Settlement and Custody Bank Inc.): Service of pension funds saving 
is provided by Takasbank.  
  
       Figure. Flow chart for IPS 
 
                    Source: Uğur (2004) 
  
 
 
Features of IPS in Turkey 
Contributions 
IPS is financed by participants’ term (optional) payments. Participation to system is 
voluntary, yet paying a contribution is mandatory. Participants may pay any amount of 
contribution with the condition of not being less than the amount that has been 
specified in the pension contract. Additional contributions may be paid whenever 
participants want beside of regular contribution. Although there is no comment about 
payment period in legislation, payment period may be selected as monthly, quarterly, 
semi-annually and annually in practice. The total contributions in the system has 
amounted to 12.44 billion TL in 2012 (PMC, 2012) showing a steep rise in 2009 and 
2010. 
 
Expense Fees 
Pension companies possess the right of taking fees from participants for fulfilling the 
expenses of individual pension activities according to conditions specified in the 
pension contract. Entrance Fee is taken from the new contracts for beginning expenses 
of pension activities and can’t exceed the amount of minimum wage in relevant date. 
Administrative Expenses Fee is a cut from regular contributions not exceeding 8 %. 
Fund Management Fee is calculated on the net pension fund assets and can’t exceed 
daily % 0.010. In the IPS Progress Report 2010 PMC reports that entrance fee, 
administrative fees and fund management fees constitute 24, 31 and 45 % of the total 
fees, respectively. 
Tax Incentives 
There are some tax incentives in IPS for encouraging participation and tax 
implementations for preventing from opting out of the system before the vesting 
period. Participants can deduct contributions from taxable income within certain 
limits. Those who were entitled to retirement and left the system due to disability or 
death, are exempted from income tax of 25%. Pension mutual funds with stock 
holdings of at least 25%, pay no corporate tax for profits from portfolio management. 
Moreover, all transaction of pension companies and participants about IPS, are 
exempted from stamp tax (duty) (Uğur, 2004). On the other hand, participants who 
leave the system before completing 10 years, pay 15% of entire accumulation as 
income tax. Those that leave after completing 10 years but at an age less than 56 years 
old pay 10% income taxes over the entire accumulation. 
 
Data  
A general overview of the variables shows that the most important factor is average 
monthly contribution as an indicator of participant behavior. In data, there are too 
many “0”s and “extremely high” average monthly contribution amounts. We assume 
that the zeros are actually “missing” values and these are approximately 120,000 rows. 
The other problem is “extremely high” contributions that correspond to monthly 
contribution amounts over 5000 TL ($2780). We assume that majority of this group 
are companies, which use the pension funds as an investment instrument. We prefer to 
focus on individual usage of pension funds. Therefore a threshold amount of 5000 TL 
(($2780) is specified for individual participants. As a result of this assumption, 
approximate 700,000 rows are dropped and the final data set consists of 3,779,918 
contracts. 
 
